Entrepreneurship and Economic Theory by Khalil, Elias
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Entrepreneurship and Economic Theory
Elias Khalil
13 October 2006
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/501/
MPRA Paper No. 501, posted 18 October 2006
 Entrepreneurship and Economic Theory 
[To appear in Michel Weber (ed.) Handbook of Whiteheadian Process 
Thought.  Frankfurt: Verlag, 2007, forthcoming] 
 
Elias L. Khalil1
 
 
1. What is the Question? 
Let us define entrepreneurship as creativity and the evolution of 
novelty.  Let us suppose, the main thesis of the chapter, that 
entrepreneurship is an action that does not differ from everyday action 
such as walking, driving, or chewing gum.  If the definition and 
supposition are granted we can conclude, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
that the theory of everyday action, such as walking or chewing gum, is 
one and the same as the theory of evolution.   
 
 
Everyday Action ≡ Entrepreneurial Action ≡ Evoution 
Figure 1: A Single Theory of Action and Evolution 
 
The conclusion is definitely strange if not extraordinary.  It is 
based on a subtle but subversive thesis:  There is no difference 
between everyday action and creativity or evolution.  This conclusion 
is extraordinary only because it goes against the dominant dogmas in 
economics (i.e., neoclassical theory) and evolutionary biology (i.e., 
neo-Darwinian theory).  Both dogmas draw a radical divide between 
action and evolution.  For neo-Darwinian theory, action is phenotype 
ultimately determined by genotype—while the genotype evolves 
according to another mechanism.  For neoclassical economics, action 
is determined by rational calculation of the efficient allocation of 
given resources—while resources evolve according to another 
mechanism.  To undermine the radical divide between the theory of 
action and the theory of evolution, this chapter shows how everyday 
action—from walking, fetching water, to fishing—is entrepreneurial 
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at first level of approximation—and hence should be the basis of the 
theory of evolution. 
 
Let us start with Robinson Crusoe, a favorite among 
economists.  Robinson’s “everyday action” would involve going to the 
sea to catch fish with his bare hands.  Robinson’s “entrepreneurial 
action” might involve the sharpening of a tree branch to catch fish.  
The term “evolution” denotes the change of technology from the use 
of bare hands to the use of branches.2
 
However, the technology of catching fish by hand is 
entrepreneurial because the action undergoes improvement through 
time. The agent will learn different ways of using the hands. For 
instance, one way might be to use the hands along with the chest to 
block and trap the fish. Another way is to dive from a rock onto the 
fish, which amounts to using the body and the hands as a spear. The 
latter method would make it easier to find a new function for the tree 
branch, i.e., to replace the invented function of the arm/hand.  So, 
evolutionary change is not limited to the physical use of the tree 
branch.  The tree branch is actually a continuation of the everyday 
action of catching fish by hand—where such action has already 
undergone change.  As Alfred Lotka argues (1945), there is no 
ultimate difference between manufactured tools and biological tools; 
this is also implied in Richard Dawkins’ concept of “extended 
phenotype” (1982).  So, everyday action entails evolution.  The fact 
that an evolutionary change appears as a quantum jump should not 
mislead us to conceive evolution or entrepreneurship as contrary to 
everyday action. 
 
It is common knowledge that the «progress» of economic theory in the 
past two centuries has neglected entrepreneurship (see Baumol, 1968; 
Demsetz, 1983; Blaug, 1998; Endres & Woods, 2006).  This should 
not mean that economists did not discuss entrepreneurship.  Actually, 
they have discussed it intensively, especially starting in the early 
1980s.  These discussions, as Milo Bianchi and Magnus Henrekson 
(2005) demonstrate, generally trace entrepreneurship to some talent, 
drive, or individual trait and then proceed to draw the macro-
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economic implications.  That is, these discussions do not explain 
entrepreneurship. 
The fact that neoclassical theory has no explanation of 
entrepreneurship is not accidental.  It is rather due to a fallacious 
dichotomy that underpins neoclassical theory between everyday action 
and entrepreneurial action. The dichotomy is certainly helpful in 
solving many problems at secondary and tertiary approximations.  
However, at first approximation, if we want to analyze 
entrepreneurship, the dichotomy is unfounded. The dichotomy 
amounts to presenting everyday action as instrumental or, to use the 
economist terminology, “maximizing” behavior, while presenting 
entrepreneurial action as creative in the sense of innovative. 
Consequently, there is no single theory that can explain everyday 
action and entrepreneurship/evolution. 
 
The everyday/entrepreneurial dichotomy leads economists into 
two choices:  The first choice, undertaken by the classical and 
Austrian economic traditions, is to assume that entrepreneurship is 
part of the nature of the actor, i.e., a character trait.  The second 
choice, undertaken by the neoclassical tradition, is to postulate that 
entrepreneurship, similar to innovation, is the outcome of stochastic, 
exogenous shocks.  This approach has been used extensively in 
growth models.  Another approach, used in neoclassical industrial 
organization literature, is to model innovations as output of a 
production function, where the inputs are investments in research and 
development.  As Suzanne Scotchmer (2004) shows, this amounts to 
treating innovations as products such as shoes and clothes.  This 
means that innovations can be produced at will as if they are 
paradoxically already known. 
 
In contrast, Anthony Endres and Christine Woods (2006) have 
suggested a three-way distinction among three theories of the 
entrepreneur—neoclassical economics, Austrian economics, and 
behavioral economics.  However, as they concede, there are very close 
similarities between Austrian economics and behavioral economics. 
On the other hand, some aspects of behavioral economics can be 
easily incorporated into neoclassical economics (Khalil, 2006a).  For 
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instance, the notion of bounded rationality, as proposed by Herbert 
Simon (1957, 1987), has been incorporated into neoclassical 
economics.  It is now part of the general idea of scarcity, but extended 
to the human brain: as a consequence of limited computational 
capacity, agents use heuristics and rules of thumb, leading to mistaken 
decision-making on some occasions. So, in the end, the insights of 
behavioral economics are incorporated either into neoclassical 
economics or Austrian economics. Therefore, economists have so far 
resorted to one of these two alternatives: either entrepreneurship is the 
product of a personality trait (Austrian/classical) or the result of some 
exogenous stochastic shocks (neoclassical). 
 
Neither option is satisfactory, however. The option that traces 
entrepreneurship to some natural character is basically tautological.  
The option that traces entrepreneurship to exogenous shocks simply 
begs the question: what is the origin of the shock?  So, we need to go 
back to the drawing board, and formulate a different theory of action.  
 
2. The Plan of the Essay 
The attempt to articulate a single theory of action and 
evolution may sound ambitious. The dominant economic theory has 
no theories of evolution or entrepreneurship, other than the appeal to 
exogenous factors. This is an embarrassing state of affairs given that 
entrepreneurship is the main impetus of economic development, 
prosperity, and evolutionary change.   
 
But this state of affairs should not be surprising.  For the most 
part, neoclassical economic theory has severed the connection 
between everyday action and entrepreneurial action and, in turn, 
presented everyday action as a mechanistic response to stimulus.  
Consequently, entrepreneurial action has to be introduced as the 
outcome of unexplained exogenous events. Classical and Austrian 
economics, on the other hand, reject the idea of action as a 
mechanistic response to stimulus. They present action as expressive of 
some innate essence or character trait and, hence, entrepreneurial 
action is at the heart of action itself. But this argument is tautologous: 
entrepreneurs are entrepreneurs because it is in their nature to be 
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entrepreneurs. In short, neoclassical theory presents action as 
mechanistic and conceives entrepreneurship as an exogenous 
intervention in everyday affairs. In contrast, the other approaches 
present action as expressive of essences, and thus entrepreneurship is 
explained by assuming entrepreneurship. The dichotomy formulated 
by John Dewey and Arthur Bentley (1999), between the 
“interactional” and the “self-actional,” can be profitably applied here.  
Neoclassical theory holds entrepreneurship to be “interactional” 
insofar as the agent reacts to changing stimuli. In contrast, according 
to classical/Austrian theory, entrepreneurship is “self-actional” in the 
sense that the agent is motivated by an essence or a trait in one’s 
nature and, hence, may change one’s action without any change in the 
stimulus (Khalil, 2003a). 
 
Despite the differences between the interactional and self-
actional views, they share a common substantivist metaphysics, which 
forms the deeper reason for their inability to explain entrepreneurship.  
According to this metaphysics, an agent consists of two parts—the 
“end” of the agent, and the “means,” such as bodily ability, physical 
tools, and natural resources. Interactional and self-actional approaches 
may differ in specifying the contents of ends and means, but both are 
substantivist in the sense that the agent becomes a divisible individual, 
and each part of the agent is treated as a substance that can be defined 
independently of the other part. Such a metaphysics hinders the ability 
to see how action entails the creative development of the agent, i.e., 
evolution. 
 
It is the contention of this essay that economics is incapable of 
explaining entrepreneurship as long as its theory of action is informed 
by a substantivist metaphysics, i.e., by the end-means dichotomy that 
divides the individual in half. To explain entrepreneurship-qua-
creativity, we need to break away from the substantivist metaphysics 
of economics. The work of Alfred North Whitehead and other process 
philosophers provide a clear alternative to substantivist metaphysics.  
Whiteheadian process thought advances a philosophy of the organism, 
called here “organismic” metaphysics. The organismic approach 
should help us identify the problems one must overcome in order to 
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explain entrepreneurship.3 In short, the essay seeks to build bridges 
between a Whiteheadian approach, Deweyan terminology, and the two 
basic traditions in economics. Figure 2 summarizes the terminology 
we will use.  
 
  
                                                                                         
                            Interactional View (mechanistic)—Neoclassical Economics         
 
 
Substantivist  
   Approach:  
 
                            Self-Actional View (essentialist)—Classical/Austrian Econ.         
 
 
Organismic Approach: Whiteheadian View 
 
Figure 2: A Guide to the Terminology 
 
3. Neoclassical Economics 
Every tradition in economics is defined by its answers to the 
most fundamental questions: What is the human condition which 
economists call the “economic problem”? What are the issues that 
humans need to focus on in order to solve the economic problem? 
  
The economic problem, for neoclassical economics, is the 
problem of “scarcity.” That is, we have to be efficient in how we use 
resources because resources are scarce. If there were no scarcity, there 
would be no need to attend to the issue of efficiency—and there would 
be no need for the discipline of economics. It is crucial to note that the 
neoclassical notion of scarcity is narrow, and differs from the common 
usage of the term. Crucially, it ignores creativity, i.e., the ability of the 
agent to create more resources. From the neoclassical perspective, 
resources are scarce in the sense that the budget is “given,” i.e., 
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defined as a basket of goods. The agent can only decide how to make 
the best, i.e. efficient, use of the contents of the given basket.   
 
The core of the neoclassical program is the idea of efficiency 
(or allocation). The roots of this idea can be traced to the 1870s when 
three economists independently advocated marginalist analysis in 
what came to be called the “marginalist revolution” (Blaug, 1997, 
Chapter 8). Leon Walras in Switzerland, Carl Menger in Austria, and 
William Stanley Jevons in England advanced the simple and 
seemingly innocuous idea that when agents decide to consume goods, 
such as peanuts, they do not make a decision whether to consume all 
(e.g., one kilogram) or none. They can decide to consume a fraction of 
the kilogram. As agents consume more, they get less satisfaction from 
the last unit, i.e., the marginal satisfaction declines with more 
consumption of the same good. Thus, as they consume more, other 
alternatives start to look attractive. They would be ready to consume 
more only if the price of the good declines relative to the prices of the 
alternatives. 
 
This means that agents arrange their consumption efficiently, 
i.e., make sure that they receive the greatest satisfaction from their 
given resources. For instance, if the price of peanuts goes up, they 
reason that it would be better to spend the last euro on some other 
good. So, agents allocate their resources among diverse goods in such 
a way that the satisfaction they receive from the expenditure of the last 
euro on each good gives them an equal amount of satisfaction. For 
instance, if the agent receives twice as much satisfaction from the last 
euro spent on good X as from the satisfaction derived from the last 
euro spent on good Y, the agent would not be rational. To be rational 
is to be efficient: the agent should demand more of good X and less of 
good Y until the satisfaction derived from the last euro spent on both 
is equal. And if the price of good Y declines, it means the last euro 
spent on Y generates greater utility than the last euro spent on all other 
goods. This prompts the agent to demand more of Y, or less of all 
other goods, until one’s given resources are spread efficiently. 
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This basic idea can be expressed mathematically as the 
maximization of the utility function (U), given the income 
constraint (I): 
 
Maximize:  U = U (X, Y, Z) 
Subject to constraint:  I = pxX + pyY + pzZ 
where X,Y, and Z are the quantities of three different goods, and px, 
py, and pz the respective prices of the three goods.  So, the consumer 
allocates one’s given income (I) among the three different goods in 
such a way that the mix of the three goods would give the agent the 
greatest satisfaction (U). 
 
The same logic of maximization applies when the maximizer 
is a firm. Let us say that the firm produces the good X and sells it at 
the market price px. The firm, in competitive markets, cannot control 
the price. Also, in competitive markets, the firm cannot control the 
amount it sells (for reasons that need not be discussed here). What the 
firm can control is the mix of inputs that produce the good X. In 
neoclassical theory, it is traditional to assume three inputs—labor (L), 
capital (K), and land (T). So, the firm, in order to maximize profits 
(π), wants to employ these inputs in such a way that minimizes its cost 
according to this formula 
 
Maximize:  π  = pxX – TC 
Subject to constraint: TC = wL + iK + rT, 
 
where pxX is total revenue; TC total cost; w, i, and r are the wage rate, 
interest rate, and rent of the three inputs, respectively. In this fashion, 
given total revenue pxX, the firm maximizes profits (π) when it 
minimizes the budget used to produce X, i.e., total cost (TC).  The 
firm can, according to neoclassical economics, minimize total cost 
without improving the technology. As discussed below, this feature 
sets neoclassical economics apart from classical economics. 
But how can one suppose that the firm minimizes total cost 
without an improvement of technology or, alternatively, finding 
cheaper resources? One could suppose so because, again, of marginal 
analysis. The contribution of each input is conceived to decline at the 
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margin as the firm adds more inputs. For instance, if the firm adds an 
extra unit of labor to a given piece of land or a given factory, output 
increases, but it increases at a declining rate. Or, when the firm 
withdraws a unit of labor, the marginal contribution of the remaining 
labor would rise. The task for the firm is to combine inputs in such a 
way that the contribution of each, given its cost, is equalized across all 
inputs. So, if the price of one input increases, the firm would use less 
of that input until its marginal contribution is higher, i.e., justified by 
the higher price. 
There are many details in the theories of consumption and 
production that we can ignore. The salient point that underlies both 
theories is that the agent—whether consumer or producer—can 
manipulate the mixture of the means in order to maximize the end. In 
the case of the consumer, the means are the different goods of 
enjoyment. In the case of the producer, the means are the different 
inputs into the production process. While the consumer tries to make 
the best of a given budget, the producer tries to minimize the budget 
of producing a given output. In either case, the means are supposedly 
combined efficiently in order to maximize the product (utility) given 
the budget or, what is the same thing, to minimize the budget given 
the product (output). 
In maximization/minimization, action is mechanistic. Action is 
simply a reaction to the stimulus, for instance, the change of the price 
of goods. Such a reaction does not prompt technological innovation or 
creativity. So, how can entrepreneurship-qua-creativity be explained?  
The only option is to assume that creativity takes place due to shocks 
from the outside the system. The neoclassical notion of efficiency 
simply cannot explain creativity, which it was constructed, from the 
beginning, to ignore. 
 
4. Classical Economics  
Does classical economics offer a framework that can better 
explain entrepreneurship? Much has been written about the classical 
tradition and how it differs from neoclassical economics (e.g., Harris, 
1978, Introduction). One can trace the classical tradition to Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx. It has experienced a revival 
recently in the work of modern Marxian economists (e.g., Shaikh & 
 
E n - t ê t e  i m p a i r e  1 0  
Tonak, 1994) and neo-Ricardians such as Piero Sraffa (1960; cf. 
Steedman, 1977). 
 
While neoclassical economics defines the economic problem 
in terms of efficiency, classical economics defines the economic 
problem in terms of the production of surplus.  In the classical 
paradigm, resources are not scarce, but rather spread through nature in 
heterogenous qualities. For example, land is not scarce, but rather it 
comes in different gradations of quality or proximity to a desired 
location. The economic problem for classical economists is how 
agents can work productively and abstain from luxury consumption so 
that they can effectively reach out to lower quality resources. If agents 
do not work productively, the product of low-quality land may not 
justify the effort, i.e., the surplus would be negative. 
 
So, the reduction of unproductive activities is a major policy 
conclusion of classical economics. Agents have to make such 
differently available resources readily available. Thus, the economic 
problem is not about the optimum or proper mix of inputs or goods to 
maximize an output. It is rather the application of productive capacity 
to subjugate nature and make less accessible resources—such as less 
fertile land or mineral deposits that are harder to extract—more ready 
for human consumption. 
 
The application of productive capacity involves the 
expenditure of matter and energy, what Karl Marx called the “means 
of production.” The economic problem is that the resulting output 
should at least be large enough to cover the costs of the expended 
inputs or means of production. That is, the economic problem amounts 
to securing non-negative surplus (S), the difference between output 
(O) and input (I): 
 
S = O – I. 
 
Given this simple equation, the economic problem is defined as the 
production of non-negative surplus (S ≥0).4
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Interestingly, with one important difference, the surplus formula 
resembles the profit function in neoclassical theory mentioned above, 
viz., 
π  = pxX – TC 
 
where S corresponds to π, O to pxX, and I to TC.  The one important 
difference is that TC in neoclassical theory can be minimized by 
adjusting the mix of inputs in light of changing input prices while 
using the same technology. In contrast, for classical theory, inputs (I) 
is a single value given by the technology. No degree of adjustment to 
the input mix can change the input cost, because inputs cannot be 
combined in different proportions. That is, for classical theory, each 
technology has one single combination or mix of inputs and, hence, 
has one single I. Economists call such technology “Leontieff 
technology,” which does not allow substitution or re-combination 
among inputs. In other words, for neoclassical theory, there is more 
than one way to produce X using the same technology, while for 
classical theory, there is only one way of producing X using the same 
technology. 
 
However, if the classical formula of surplus allows only one 
way of producing X, what is the agent doing in classical economics?  
There is no efficiency problem in classical economics and, hence, the 
agent cannot be allocating resources, i.e., choosing the correct mix of 
inputs. 
 
Nonetheless, the agent can have two different functions in the 
classical model. First, the agent can expand output by either abstaining 
from luxury consumption or by reducing expenditures on 
unproductive services. Luxury consumption and unproductive services 
are seen as superfluous and, to promote economic growth, they can be 
reduced at will. Second, the agent can invent a new technology that 
improves on the method of production, i.e., leads to greater output per 
input.   
 
Concerning the first function, can the agent reduce luxury 
consumption and unproductive services at will?  Regarding luxury, if 
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the agent reduces luxury consumption, the agent would be able to 
invest the saved income which, in the second period, would lead to 
higher output. However, upon reflection, the reduction of luxury and 
the consequent economic growth does not necessarily entail 
innovation or evolution of technology.  The growth can take place on 
a replicative scale.   
 
Concerning the productive/unproductive distinction, it is 
ultimately untenable. To make sense of the concept of unproductive 
labor, one must assume an identical system without the supposedly 
redundant or unproductive labor. But why should one stipulate that 
such an ideal system is tenable or costless? For instance, if there is 
expenditure on guards, accountants, and lawyers, their services must 
have been needed given the level of trust in society, which is 
obviously less than ideal. But even in an ideal system of trust, it is not 
costless to maintain such institutions. In the ideal system, society must 
spend a great amount of resources on education, public occasions, and 
the like to sustain the level of trust. But classical economists did not 
see it in this manner. They preached the virtue of magnification of 
surplus. They saw luxury consumption as the clear enemy of the 
production of surplus and the wealth of nations. They also saw 
unproductive expenditure on bureaucracy, army, and other services as 
the clear enemy of surplus and the wealth of nations.   
 
This raises the issue: Why should humans strive to magnify the 
surplus? Why should the capitalists ensure, to use Marx’s term, the 
“accumulation of capital”? The assumption that humans are driven to 
accumulate surplus is based on an essentialist, self-actional view. It 
explains entrepreneurship, ambition, or internal motivation by 
assuming it (Khalil, 2006b). 
 
Such a tautological explanation is more evident in the second 
supposed function of the agent in the classical model. Namely, the 
agent can innovate at will. If this is the case, the agent has desires 
which are defined prior to action—as if action were merely the 
execution of a given plan.5 This is why Dewey and Bentley called 
such an explanation “self-actional”: the action is supposed to 
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externalize a deep desire for greater wealth or surplus. To enhance the 
production of surplus per unit of input, the agent must dedicate a 
portion of current surplus to the research and innovation that brings 
about an improved technology. Such improved technology entails that 
greater output is produced for the same input expended or, 
equivalently, that the same output is produced with less inputs.     
 
But the function of innovating again begs the question: Why is the 
agent driven to innovate? Classical theory explains creativity by 
assuming it. 
   
5. Austrian Economics 
Austrian economics is also generally based on an essentialist, 
self-actional view (see Smith, 1990). For Austrian economists, 
entrepreneurship is an expression of purposeful, human action, as 
opposed to so-called mechanistic action. This opposition is best 
expressed in the notion of “praxis” in the work of Ludwig von Mises 
(1966), a major figure in Austrian economics. Mises distinguishes 
between purposeful behavior, which can only be found in humans, and 
mechanistic behavior, which characterizes the behavior of non-human 
animals/plants and the biological aspects of human behavior such as 
instincts. The human/non-human distinction runs through much of the 
social theory informed by Germanic romanticism (Khalil, 1996). The 
Austrian dichotomy, similar to Marx’s concept of abstract labor, is a 
reminder of the essentialist metaphysics of vitalism, but carried over 
to the supposed divide between human and non-human living 
organisms.6
 
Joseph Schumpeter (1949) also regards entrepreneurship as 
expressive of the human impulse to be creative. But he differs from 
Mises by regarding entrepreneurship as a character trait possessed by 
different people in different degrees, or even not at all. Schumpeter 
likened the entrepreneur to the medieval knight who rushes to 
adventure out of an urge for self-aggrandizement. Such an urge, which 
Schumpeter playfully called “irrational,” differs from arbitrage, i.e., a 
mechanistic action that takes advantage of the difference in prices of 
the same good. Arbitrage is the calculative action of rational agents 
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who make money by buying cheap in one market and selling dear in 
another. Such action helps the two markets to be connected and, 
hence, to become one market, i.e., to reach an equilibrium. In contrast, 
driven by inner impulses the entrepreneur introduces new ideas or 
novelty as a way to self-aggrandizement, and in the process upsets the 
old equilibrium. 
 
On the other hand, for Israel Kirzner (1973, 1985), a student of 
Mises, the entrepreneur brings order to the system. As an arbitrageur, 
the entrepreneur is distinguished from other agents by greater 
“alertness.”  Such a trait allows the entrepreneur to see opportunities, 
such as differences in prices, which others cannot.7
 
Despite their differences, Mises, Schumpeter, and Kirzner 
identify entrepreneurship as a character trait unique to humans.  
Likewise, Frank Knight (1971), who sympathizes with Austrian 
economics in other regards, views the entrepreneur as a risk-taker—
ready to take action when outcomes are uncertain. Knight 
distinguishes between risk, which is quantifiable, and uncertainty, 
which is a unique. One cannot form a quantifiable probability of 
unique events. Sometimes, the agent is in total ignorance, unaware of 
whether the event is unique. Agents who bid on unique events may 
earn windfall profits because the cost of the bid cannot reflect 
probability that is non-quantifiable. Such windfall profits cannot be 
equalized in the market because the market can only equalize ordinary 
profits that stem from quantifiable or predictable events, i.e., risk. So, 
for Knight, entrepreneurs are the residual claimant of activities that 
are uncertain, which are to be distinguished from ordinary or risky 
activities. Knight’s view explains the persistence of windfalls profits.  
However, this explanation does not explain entrepreneurship itself.  
 
All these theories in the Austrian tradition, which are similar in 
some aspects to the classical tradition, see entrepreneurial action as 
expressive of a character trait. While ordinary agents may not be 
characterized by such a trait, the ones who are so are identified as 
entrepreneurs. This explanation, similar to that proffered by classical 
economics, is a tautology: it explains entrepreneurship by assuming it.   
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6. The End-Means Dichotomy 
 
As mentioned above, both economic approaches are limited by 
their assumption of a substantivist metaphysics that divides the agent 
into two independent substances. One of these two halves consists of 
the end which the agent tries to maximize; this may be the 
utility/profit of neoclassical economics, or the surplus of classical 
economics. The other half consists of the means that the agent needs 
to recombine efficiently (neoclassical theory) or reduce (classical 
theory). But this ends-means dichotomy cannot accommodate 
creativity and the rise of novelty.8 The basic problem with the 
dichotomy is that it pits the agent against the agent’s capability, which 
the agent, in both theories, sees in a wholly instrumental fashion. In 
both schools of thought, the resources of the agents (TC in 
neoclassical theory, and I in classical theory) are combined with the 
environment before they are juxtaposed against the end. So, the agent 
treats his own body, skills, mental and physical development, and 
tools as objects that stand external to himself; they are regarded no 
differently than are trees, rivers, and soil, say.   
 
In neoclassical theory, land (T) is treated symmetrically with 
labor (L) and capital (K). To start with, human labor and tools are 
mere capacities to perform work, while land is the source of nutrients, 
minerals, and materials which the agent needs to appropriate—and 
indeed to rob.9 Obviously, as a result of production, land (T) does not 
become more creative, but on the contrary loses some of its nutrients 
and resources. To treat the capacity to perform work (L and K) as 
symmetrical with T amounts to treating them as incapable of 
creativity.  Labor and its tools (K) are there to assist in robbing nature, 
while land is the object of such action.   
 
The same issues arise in classical theory. Production is 
conceived as the application of a set of instruments, including human 
labor, which is juxtaposed against the goal of the agent. Marx, for 
instance, Marx presents the “labor process” (i.e., production) as the 
extraction of surplus, where the agent is separated from one’s own 
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labor power.10  Thus in the classical tradition too, the agent is divided 
into the “end” and the “means.” The means include the environment 
as well as the skill and tools of the laborer.     
 
7. What is Missing in the End-Means Dichotomy? 
 
The end-means dichotomy is a useful approximation 
particularly in engineering projects. It allows the engineer to evaluate 
one action as opposed to another while assuming that means are 
external to the end. However, means cannot be given. They are part of 
the evolving capacity of the actor. This capacity is evolving because 
action, any action, is a creative act which leads to the development of 
the actor (Khalil, 1997a). While the ends-mean dichotomy is useful 
for some engineering problems, it cannot be used if we are interested 
in understanding the evolution of capacity. The dichotomy treats 
capacity as, first, a well-defined substance and, second, as part of 
other elements that make up the environment which confronts the 
agent. The problem in this picture is the radical split of the actor into 
two halves, where the end or mental images are set apart from the 
agent’s capacity.   
 
In this manner, the end-means dichotomy cannot allow us to 
understand entrepreneurship. The end-means dichotomy does not 
allow us to see the agent as an organism—a conception needed if we 
want to understand evolution or creativity, at least as related to 
everyday action. 
 
If we need to explain entrepreneurship-qua-creativity, the entry 
point of theorizing should be the actor as a whole, i.e., the unity of the 
end and the means—where the means here are limited to the set of 
tools of production. That is, the set of tools does not include the 
environmental nutrients and minerals that the agent wants to extract.  
In this manner, with an organismic view of the actor, the tools of 
production would be seen as inseparable from the end, whether it be 
utility/profit (neoclassical theory) or surplus (classical theory). If the 
goal is to explain action in the most fundamental sense, the dividing 
line should be drawn differently. It should not be between the end and 
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the means, but between the organism, or “actor,” and its environment, 
which it robs. 
 
Such a view is not permitted in the neoclassical notion of 
scarcity or efficiency. According to the neoclassical view, resources 
are given in a basket and, hence, do not need to be robbed. The 
resources only need to be re-arranged in the most optimal way. That 
is, for neoclassical theory, the problem is how to re-arrange the given 
resources of a basket so as to meet a particular criterion, such as the 
optimization of utility. However, if the economic problem is defined 
as one of survival, the agent would focus on how to rob nature to 
obtain the basket of goods in the first place.11   
 
Interestingly, Whitehead uses the expression “robbery” to 
describe the ecological relation between the actor, or “living society,” 
and the environment: 
 
Another characteristic of a living society is that it requires 
food. In a museum the crystals are kept under glass cases; 
in zoological gardens the animals are fed. Having regard to 
the universality of reactions with environment, the 
distinction is not quite absolute. It cannot, however, be 
ignored. The crystals are not agencies requiring the 
destruction of elaborate societies derived from the 
environment; a living society is such an agency. The 
societies which it destroys are its food. This food is 
destroyed by dissolving it into somewhat simpler social 
elements. It has been robbed of something. Thus, all 
societies require interplay with their environment; and in 
the case of living societies this interplay takes the form of 
robbery. The living society may, or may not, be a higher 
type of organism than the food which it disintegrates. But 
whether or no it be for the general good, life is robbery 
(Whitehead, 1978, (PR) p. 105). 
 
So, if the robber’s components, such as labor and tools, cannot be 
included in the environment set which the robber wants to rob, then 
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what does the environment set include?  It includes components that 
are external to the actor, such as the weather, raw materials, physical 
laws of nature, market fluctuations, property rights, conventions about 
standards of measure, and so on. However, contents related to the 
ability of the actor, which are misplaced as part of the constraint 
function in neoclassical and classical economics, should be placed in 
the “actor” set.  Such contents include human capital such as health, 
biological capacity, and produced tools of production used by the 
actor. 
 
The actor set, as summed up in Figure 3, is broader than the “end” set 
in neoclassical and classical economics.  The actor set includes, 
besides utility/profit, surplus, and desires such as self-aggrandizement, 
labor capacity and its tools. 
 
 
The Actor:  
Utility/profit/surplus and capital/labor/land in 
the sense of tools of production  
The Environment: 
Land in the sense of 
nutrients and 
minerals 
End: 
Utility/profit (neoclassical theory) 
Surplus (classical theory) 
Self-aggrandizement (Schumpeter) 
Means: 
Capital, labor, land 
(neoclassical and classical 
theories) 
Figure 3: What is the Proper Dividing Line? 
 
There are serious differences between the neoclassical and 
classical/Austrian views of what constitutes the “end.” The 
neoclassical, or interactional, view presents action as the result of the 
interaction between the actor’s end and the given means in the sense 
of incentives.  The classical/Austrian, or self-actional, view, presents 
action as the expression of the self—either as a norm, type, or desire.  
Despite the differences, either view splits the actor apart. One part— 
the mental—either optimizes along neoclassical theory or executes 
action according to norm, type, or desire along classical/Austrian 
theory.  The other part—the means—is used to attain the end. 
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7. Conclusion 
The proposed actor-environment partition is not a dichotomy 
as in the vitalist living/nonliving or human/nonhuman distinctions.  
The actor-environment partition does not suppose that a new element 
is introduced into nature with the emergence of life on Earth or with 
the emergence of humans. Rather, the proposed actor-environment 
partition is an ecological observation of where the boundary lies if the 
focus is on survival of the organism.  
 
In the proposed actor-environment partition, the actor is not 
split in half as in the case of the end-means dichotomy. The actor-
environment partition complements the philosophy of the organism as 
proposed by Whitehead. The divide reaffirms the unity of the actor.   
 
To note, such a unity is not based on some homogeneous 
conception of the actor. The actor is rather made up of many 
subordinate actors, each of which, in turn, is made up of other 
subordinates. For instance, an organism is made up of organs, organs 
of tissues, and tissues of cells, and so on. Each actor in this 
hierarchical complexity seeks its own goal. On the other hand, this 
should not mean that the actors within the hierarchical complexity are 
pitted against each other. Rather, they should be seen as involved in a 
cooperative enterprise according to the general plan of the organism.  
As Whitehead puts it: 
 
The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the 
plan of the whole influences the very characters of the 
various subordinate organisms which enter into it. In the 
case of an animal, the mental states enter into the plan of 
the total organism and thus modify the plans of the 
successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate 
smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached. Thus an 
electron within a living body is different from an electron 
outside it, by reason of the plan of the body. The electron 
blindly runs either within or without the body; but it runs 
within the body in accordance with its character within the 
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body; that is to say, in accordance with the general plan of 
the body, and this plan includes the mental state. But the 
principle of modification is perfectly general throughout 
nature, and represents no property peculiar to living bodies 
(SMW, 79). 
 
The proposed actor-environment juxtaposition is most 
necessary if we want to account for creativity. For one thing, it can 
explain why the actor undergoes creative development. In the 
proposed juxtaposition, the actor can never be a substance, i.e., an 
entity that is well-defined. The ability of the actor is not an instrument 
to serve an end external to it. Further, when the actor relates to the 
environment, it is the actor as a whole that is involved. The actor is 
fundamentally unified as it tries to rob resources from the 
environment.    
 
It seems also to be the case that an explanation of creativity is 
Whitehead’s main focus (e.g. AI, 181-82). Whitehead wanted to 
situate creativity or novelty in nature. He understood the organism 
broadly to include non-living organizations (such as atoms and 
molecules). In this manner, he avoided the opposition of mechanistic 
nature and freedom, which is the root of the body/mind problem (see 
Rose, 2005). But we need not go into these far-reaching and deeper 
concerns of Whitehead. For the question of economic theory, the 
organism-environment divide allows us to see creativity as part of 
action. Everyday action is one and the same as entrepreneurial action.   
 
One must remember that the environment includes organisms 
that are conspecifics and that may cooperate with each other. If they 
do, an order of society can arise, with neighborhoods or markets. This 
order of the market should be carefully distinguished from a different 
type of order, the order of the super-organism, in which an agent is a 
member of larger organism (see Khalil, 1990, 1998-99). But for our 
purpose here, it is sufficient to state that we are not dealing with 
relation of submission or authority that occasions the super-organism.  
Rather, the relation under focus is between the organism and the 
external environment, which may or may not give rise to orderly 
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patterns such as the market or traffic flow.  But we need to start with 
the relation of the organism to the external environment, rather than 
the market, if we want to analyse the challenge that faces the 
organism.  Such a challenge might be the basis for the decision to 
submit to authority and, hence, be part of a super-organism, such as 
the firm. 
 
In its relations with its external environment, the actor as an 
organism is a unified unit subsisting on its environment. Such actor-
environment juxtaposition is useful insofar as it provides an account 
of creativity, which the substantivist view underpinning the end-
means dichotomy cannot. The actor-environment juxtaposition 
highlights that the actor’s main challenge is to remain acting, i.e., 
remain in the game of survival. As such, the actor is not mainly trying 
to maximize an output while assuming its’ own ability as a given.  
Rather, it acts because if it does not it will not be able to maintain its 
own organizational cohesion. In this regard, the actor is not a 
substance but rather sees itself only in relation to the environment.  
The main unit of analysis here is the relation between the actor and its 
environment.   
 
Such an organismic view affords an endogenous account of 
creative action and the rise of novelty. When the actor acts, the actor 
acquires a new ability or knowledge. Also, the environment upon 
which the actor acts undergoes change because of its action. The 
transformation of the environment ensued here differs from the 
stochastic fluctuation of the environment that may take place for other 
reasons.  But even if the environment remains the same, the actor 
experiences it differently because of the knowledge or ability which 
the actor acquired in the process.  Therefore, the theory of action is 
also a theory of creativity, and the theory of creativity is also the 
theory of action.   
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Email: Elias.khalil@buseco.monash.edu.au.  Department of 
Economics, Monash University, Clayton, VIC 3800, Australia.  The 
author greatly appreciates the comments of Michel Weber, Anthony 
Endres, and, especially, Giampaolo Garzarelli and the editorial 
assistance of Simon Hone and William Desmond.  The usual caveat 
applies. 
  
2 The evolutionary change can be “micro” if it involves the 
improvement of the skill of catching fish with bare hands or the 
improvement of the skill of catching fish with a sharpened tree branch.  
The evolutionary change can be “macro” if it involves the movement 
from the use of bare hands to the use of the sharpened tree branch.  
There should ultimately be no difference between micro- and macro-
evolution. But this is a subject outside the focus of this essay. 
 
3 I am aware of only one economist, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen 
(1972) who seriously studied the notions of creativity, novelty, and 
evolution in the Whiteheadian process tradition.  Unfortunately, 
whatever Whiteheadian insights Georgescu-Roegen gained, he 
confused them with the entropy law (Khalil, 1990a). Put succinctly, 
Georgescu-Roegen thought that the irreversible increase of entropy in 
a closed universe is identical with Whitehead’s understanding of 
evolutionary change as the appearance of novelty.   
 
4 In case the economy consists of more than one commodity, the 
variables S, O, and I must have the same metric. Marx developed a 
theory of value, his “labor theory of value,” to provide such a metric.  
Marx’s metric ran into many problems, the most famous of which is 
the “transformation problem” (Foley, 2000).  Ricardo, followed by 
Sraffa, developed a different metric, a composite index of value, 
which avoids the transformation problem (Steedman, 1977). We need 
not discuss the controversies surrounding the appropriate metric.   
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5 In some sense, my earlier essay (Khalil, 1997a) can partially be 
characterized in the vitalist, classical economics tradition, where 
agents are portrayed as motivated by self-competition: they try to 
excel beyond their previous achievements. 
 
6 See Samuel Hollander (2004) for a closely related observation of the 
similarity of Marx’s and von Mises’s views of the actor. 
 
7 In a sense, my earlier essay (Khalil, 2003b) offers a Deweyan view 
of entrepreneurship where agents, empowered by different 
perspectives, see the same substance differently. 
 
8 The same identical substantive metaphysics underpins neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory which hinders it from advancing a 
developmental view of evolution (Khalil, 1993). 
 
9 The use of the term “rob” is not accidental. It is a term used by 
Whitehead, and it is used here to stress that the economic problem is 
ultimately about survival, for the actor must rob the environment in 
order to maintain himself. This is a common view in ecological 
science and ecological economics (Khalil, 1997b).   
 
10 1976, Chapter 7. Marx strongly differentiates the “labor process” of 
humans from the labor activity of insects. For humans, the act of 
production involves the mental conception of the process which is 
supposedly prior to execution. For insects, there is supposedly no such 
mental representation. Insects simply act according to their given 
nature. So, for Marx, human mentality clearly stands outside nature.  
Such a view asserts a non-bridgeable gulf between mental conception 
and action, as if both were separate substances. Given the classical 
definition of the economic problem as the production of surplus, Marx 
is forced to adopt the substantivist view, and in particular the 
dichotomy between action and conception of the action (see Khalil, 
1992). Marx is forced to adopt such a position in order to argue that 
diverse human activities, such as tailoring and carpentry, can be 
compared because they are mere instances of the same substance, viz., 
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homogeneous in terms of the abstract mental component which Marx 
called “abstract labor.” Using concept of “abstract labor,” Marx was 
able to the metric to account for the surplus. Even if the agent were 
Robinson Crusoe, where he undertakes all different specializations 
during the day, at the end of the day he would still have to calculate 
the surplus. To do so, he must use a metric that allows him to add the 
diverse activities spent, e.g., on hunting as opposed to fishing. If there 
is no abstract substance underpinning the diverse heterogeneous acts 
of labor (which Marx called “concrete labor”), how can the agent 
know whether he is producing a surplus? So, to produce a surplus, the 
agent must treat his labor as something external to himself—as an 
instrument that can be calibrated by an engineer and can tabulated 
along a ledger of costs that stand apart from the end. 
 
11 It is obvious that the actor should not rob his own tools of 
production—such as his health, limbs, physical capital, and so on—in 
order to survive. For instance, the actor should avoid addictive 
substances if he wants to maintain his health or, in general, his 
“human capital.” Although this point is obvious, the end-means 
dichotomy entails that the actor could rob his own human capital if it 
maximizes his utility. His human capital is part of the means to be 
exploited. In fact, in his model of addiction, Gary Becker (1996) 
portrays addiction as no different from entrenched habits of 
consumption, such as the habit of partiality to a particular music. The 
term “rob” is used to stress that we should include the means of 
production in the actor set rather than in the set to be robbed. 
 
 
